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Constitutional Challenges to Indiana's
Third-Party Custody Statutes
KRISTEN

H.

FOWLER*

Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.'

INTRODUCTION

American families are changing. 2 While families traditionally consisted of a father,
a mother, and some children, modem families are increasingly diverse. In 1950,
married-couple households represented seventy-eight percent of families; in 2000, they
represented only fifty-two percent. 3 Nationally, more than 2.4 million grandparents are
their grandchildren's primary caregivers.4
With these changes, "persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with
increasing frequency to assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing."5 These caregivers
frequently lack legal authority to effectively parent: they cannot sign school permission
slips, consent to medical care, secure public assistance, or obtain proper health
insurance for children in their care.6 In response, several states, including Indiana, have
enacted third-party custody and visitation statutes.7 While these changes were meant to
assist third parties who are legitimately caring for others' children, they pose a
constitutional threat to natural parents capable of caring for their own children.
This Note examines Indiana's third-party custody and visitation statutes for
violations of constitutional parental rights. Part I of this Note traces the evolution of
parental rights jurisprudence at the United States Supreme Court level, beginning with
Meyer v. Nebraska and continuing to the most recent developments in Troxel v.
Granville. Part II synthesizes the cases to define the current scope of parental rights.
Part III describes Indiana's child custody statutes and related case law. Part IV
analyzes several potential constitutional challenges to Indiana's child custody statutes
based on the understanding of parental rights discussed in Part II. Finally, the Note
concludes by proposing solutions that would protect parental constitutional rights while
allowing third parties to have custody in legitimate cases.

*

J.D. Candidate, 2007, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 2004,

Hanover College. I would like to thank Professor Aviva Orenstein for her helpful discussions
regarding parental and children's rights.
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (plurality opinion).
2. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing statistical
rises in the number of minors being raised by single parents or grandparents).
3. FRANK HOBBS & NICOLE STOOPS, DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDs IN THE 20TH CENTURY: CENSuS
2000 SPECIAL REPORTS 130-31 (2002), http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr4.pdf.
4. Elizabeth Barker Brandt, De Facto Custodians:A Response to the Needs of informal
Kin Caregivers?,38 FAM. L.Q. 291,291 (2004).
5. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64.
6. Brandt, supra note 4, at 292.
7. See id. at 300-12. All states also have grandparent visitation statutes. See Troxel, 530
U.S. at 74 n. 1.
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I. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT TO PARENT

Following in the Anglo-American tradition,8 the United States Supreme Court has
long recognized that parents have a right to raise their children free from state
interference; 9 however, the Court has failed to articulate exactly what that right
encompasses. Partly to blame for the Court's lack of precision is the nature of the
parenting cases brought: most parental rights cases involve claims to other rights,
particularly First Amendment rights. Adding to the confusion is the underlying debate
over substantive due process.
A. Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and the Birth ofParentalRights
The Supreme Court first recognized parental rights in 1923 when Justice
McReynolds, writing for a majority ofthe Court in Meyer v. Nebraska,articulated "the
right of the individual ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children."' 0 In
Meyer, a teacher appealed his conviction under a Nebraska law banning instruction in
languages other than English. l" The Court found the statute unconstitutional and
reversed Meyer's conviction. First, the Court identified a right to parental control in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:' 2 "the power of parents to control
the education of their own."' 3 Having implicated a due process right, the Court4
reviewed Nebraska's statute using an arbitrariness or rational basis standard,'
analyzed the benefits of modem language instruction, and found no emergency
justifying the state's need to foster homogeneity. 15Ultimately, the Court decided that
the statute was arbitrary.
Had the Meyer Court limited itself to the parental rights theory, its opinion would
have been more instructive. Instead, the Meyer opinion began a line ofunclear parental
rights cases. The Court seems to have invalidated the statute because it interfered with
four sets of due process rights: the right of the modem language teacher to fulfill his

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *443-46.
9. E.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. 57; Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
10. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.

8.

11. Id. at 396-97.

12. In doing so, the Court relied on Adkins v. Children'sHospital,261 U.S. 525 (1923),
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897),
cases whose approach to substantive due process became disfavored. Moreover, the Court failed
to mention contrary precedents of lower courts. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the
Child?": Meyer and Pierce andthe Childas Property,33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1091 &
nn. 524-25 (1992).
13. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401. "Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of
the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life; and nearly all the States,
including Nebraska, enforce this obligation by compulsory laws." Id. at 400.
14. "[L]iberty may not be interfered with ... by legislative action which is arbitrary or
without reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect." Id. at
399-400.
15. Id. at401-02.
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Despite Meyer's ambiguity, two years later the Court incorporated Meyer's parental
rights language into its opinion in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.' 7 Pierce involved a
dispute over the constitutionality of the Oregon Compulsory Education Act, which
required parents to send their children to public schools.' 8 Two private schools
challenged the law, alleging that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of
parents, students, and teachers.' 9 However, unlike in Meyer, this time parental rights
were the only set of rights that the Court relied on when striking down the law. 0 The
Oregon law could not pass the rational basis test articulated in Meyer because it had
"no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state.",2' After
embracing the new Meyer right and its accompanying standard, the PierceCourt added
some language of its own, language which would resonate throughout future parental
rights cases: "The child is not the mere creature ofthe state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right,22coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations."
B. Limiting ParentalRights: Prince v. Massachusetts and Ginsberg v. New York
The next major parental rights case arose in 1944 after a guardian was convicted for
allowing her niece to sell religious tracts in violation of a Massachusetts child labor
law.23 The woman challenged her conviction, claiming first that the law violated her
child's free exercise rights, and second that it violated her parental right to instruct her
child in religion.24 The Court disagreed. Although it paid homage to Meyer and Pierce
in its opinion, declaring that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents," 25 the Court ultimately held that "neither rights
of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation." 26 The state, as parens
patriae,did not violate parental rights by regulating child labor.27 Such regulations
effects of child employment"
protected children from the "evils... [of] the crippling
28
and were therefore within the state's power to enact.

16. See id. at 401-03. See generally Woodhouse, supranote 12, for an interesting historical
analysis of the first two parental rights cases.
17. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
18. Id. at 510,530-31. Parents who failed to send their children to public school would be
found guilty of a misdemeanor. Id. at 530 n. 1. The statute did contain some exceptions-for
example, for children who had completed the eighth grade or who were physically unable to
attend school-but the exceptions were unimportant to the case. Id.
19. Id. at 531-33.

20. Id. at 534-35.
21. Id. at 535.

22. Id.
23. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).

24. Id. at 164.
25. Id. at 166.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 166 & n.10 (citing Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)).
28. Id. at 168-69.
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Twenty-four years later, the Court again relied on the state's interest in children's
welfare to uphold a New York statute that prohibited the sale of obscene material to
minors. 29 The challenger argued that the statute interfered with parents' rights to guide
their children's development. 30 While agreeing with the PrinceCourt that "the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents," 31 the GinsbergCourt did not
find a violation of parental rights because the law was rationally related to the state's
interest in child welfare. 32 To further justify the law, the Court stated that instead of
rights, the law actually supported parents by shielding their children
violating parental
33
from harm.
C. IncreasingProtectionfor ParentalRights: Stanley v. Illinois, Wisconsin v.
Yoder, Parham v. J.R., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, and
Santosky v. Kramer
As noneconomic substantive due process doctrine grew, parental rights were
acknowledged in numerous decisions and gained status as one of the "basic civil rights
of man,",34 a right "far more precious... than property rights." 35 The family-and the
rights of the parent within the family-became protected under both the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and the Ninth Amendment.36
And the language used to describe and analyze those rights began to change.
In Stanley v. Illinois, cognizable and substantialwere the words used to describe a
father's interest in the custody, companionship, and care of his children. 7 The Court
found that the father's interests were protected by the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses against state action, including the state's practice of presuming the
unfitness of unmarried fathers for administrative convenience. 38 Still, the Court failed
to articulate a test for balancing parental rights and state action.
Traditional39 andfundamental4° were the words used to describe parents' interests
in the religious instruction of their children in Wisconsin v. Yoder. Yoder involved a
review of convictions of Amish men for violating Wisconsin's compulsory schoolattendance law. 4' The men argued that compulsory high school education, with its
emphasis on "worldly success, ' 42 threatened the survival of their community, which
was premised on a religious belief that salvation requires a life separated from worldly

29. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
30. See id. at 637-43. The challenger made several other arguments as well.
31. Id. at 639 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. at 640-41.
33. See id. at 639-41. The Court acknowledged that parents were still free to legally
provide their children with obscene material by purchasing the material for their children. Id at
639.
34. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
35. Mayv. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
Id. at 652.
Id. at 656, 658.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).
Id. at 232.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 211.
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influence. 43 Because of this threat, Amish parents preferred to keep their high-schoolaged children within the Amish community.44
Because of the combination of free exercise and parental rights, the Court required
"more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the
State' '' 45 to uphold state action. The state's interest in universal education, while
legitimate, was insufficient to justify the compulsory education law,46 particularly
because the wishes of the Amish parents would not harm the child or the public
welfare.47 And although Yoder provided another example of balancing parental rights
against state action, the Court again failed to articulate a clear test.
State power to override parental decisions was further limited in Parham v. J.R.48 In
Parham, the Court reviewed a Georgia statute allowing parents to voluntarily commit
their children to mental institutions. Although voluntary commitment involved some
danger of parental abuse and harm to the child, the Court held that "the traditional
presumption that the parents act in the best interest of their child should apply.' 49 The
state's interests in the efficient use of its health facilities and the prevention of
improper commitments, while significant, were not sufficient to require increased
procedures before voluntary commitments.50 Parham meant that states could not
interfere with parental authority just because there was a risk of harm to the child, but
there was still no test providing exactly when the state could interfere.
Procedural protection of parental rights came in Lassiterv. Departmentof Social
Services5l and Santosky v. Kramer.52 In Lassiter, the Court required the state to
provide counsel to indigent parents in proceedings to terminate parental rights,53 and in
Santosky, the Court required the state to prove its case by clear and convincing
evidence in proceedings to terminate parental rights.-4 Lassiter characterized the
parental right as an "important" and "commanding" interest, describing the interest
with strong language: "This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the
need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the companionship,
care, custody and management of his or her children' is an important interest that
'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.' 55 Likewise, Santosky described the right as a "fundamental liberty
interest
56
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child.,

43. Id.at 210.
44. Id.at 212.
45. Id.at 233 (citation omitted by the Court).
46. Id.at 233-34.
47. Id.
at 230. Had the parental decisions harmed the child or society, the state could have
intervened. Id.
at 233-34. Note that not everyone saw the Amish parental actions as so benign.
See id.
at 241-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
49. Id.at 604.
50. See id.
at 602, 604-05.
51. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
52. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). These cases balanced parental rights against a state interest in
procedural efficiency and cost.
53. See Lassiter,452 U.S. at 18.
54. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761-67
55. Lassiter,452 U.S. at 27 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
56. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.
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D. Troxel v. Granville: The Most Recent Statement of ParentalRights
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided its most recent parental rights case, Troxel v.
Granville. Although the Court again failed to produce a clear standard-no opinion
received a majority-the numerous Troxel opinions at least show us the individual
Justices' views. This Part analyzes the six Troxel opinions to show what standards
come closest to receiving a majority.
1. The Facts
Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel were involved in a relationship and had two
daughters. 57 The relationship ended in 1991, but Brad continued to visit with his
daughters on the weekends. These visits frequently occurred at the home of Brad's
parents, allowing the grandparents an opportunity to visit with the girls. In May of
1993, Brad committed suicide. After Brad's death, the grandparents continued regular
visitation with the girls, but in October, Tommie Granville decided that she would like
to limit the Troxels' visitation to one visit each month.
The Troxels filed a petition for visitation rights under a Washington statute which
provided that "[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time
including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation
rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or
not there has been any change of circumstances. '58 They requested two weekends of
overnight visitation each month and two weeks of summer visitation; Granville
continued to maintain her desire to limit visitation to one day each month. 59
The trial court entered an order in favor of the Troxels, but the Washington Court of
Appeals reversed. 60 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals,
holding that the statute "unconstitutionally infringe[d] on the fundamental right of
parents to rear their children" because the statute was overbroad and allowed third
parties to interfere without showing potential harm to the child. 6' The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
2. The Plurality Opinion
Justice O'Connor delivered a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer. First, the plurality acknowledged the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control oftheir children, labeling the interest as both a
fundamental liberty interest and as a fundamental right.62 Second, the plurality offered
two reasons why the statute unconstitutionally burdened Granville's parental rights: (1)
the statute was "breathtakingly broad" and allowed anyone to petition for visitation at

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000). Tommie and Brad never married. Id.
Id. at 61 (citing WASH. REv. CODE § 26.10.160(3)).
Id.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 63.
Id.at 66-67 (plurality opinion).
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any time 63 and (2) the statute gave no weight to Granville's decision as a fit parent. 64
Missing from the plurality's analysis were a concrete definition of the parental right
and a clear standard for balancing parental rights against the state's interest in allowing
grandparent visitation.
3. Justice Souter's Concurrence
Although Justice Souter agreed that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad,65
he disagreed with the plurality's discussion of the scope of the parental right and the
necessity of showing harm to the child.66 Justice Souter was alone in including an
"interest in controlling a child's associates" in defining a parent's right to have a
relationship with his or her child. 7 If Pierce gave parents the authority to choose
educational influences, he argued, parents should also have the authority
to choose
68
their child's associates, who are also strong social and moral influences.
4. Justice Thomas's Concurrence
Granting arguendo that the Due Process Clause includes unenumerated rights,
Justice Thomas recognized "a fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children," including their education and socialization. 69 Because a fundamental
right is involved, Justice Thomas applied strict scrutiny, requiring a compelling
governmental interest to justify the statute.70 Since Justice Thomas saw no compelling
state interest, he found the statute unconstitutional. 7'
5. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens disagreed that the statute was unconstitutional on its face because it
was not unconstitutional in all of its applications: in some cases, a third party could
constitutionally petition for visitation without showing potential harm to the child.73
However, he agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment covers a parent's "fundamental

63. Id. at 67.
64. Id. at 67-69. The plurality relied heavily on the "presumption that fit parents act in the
best interests of their children." Id. at 68.
65. See id. at 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring).
66. Id.at 77.
67. Id. at 78.
68. Id.at 78-79.
69. Id.at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Any person" includes people with legitimate reasons
to seek visitation, such as previous caregivers and grandparents. See id. Justice Stevens did not
believe that a showing of harm to the child was necessary: "we have never held that the parent's
liberty interest in this relationship is so inflexible as to establish a rigid constitutional shield,
protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any challenge absent a threshold finding of
harm." Id.
at 86.
73. See id.
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liberty interest" in raising his or her children, with the rebuttable presumption that
parents will act in their children's best interests.74
Justice Stevens elaborated on what he saw as the limitations to parental rights. First,
Stevens saw the rights as limited "by the existence of an actual, developed relationship
with a child. 75 Second, Stevens noted that in some cases, the child's interest in
associating with others could outweigh the parental interest. 76 Third, Stevens would
leave unprotected "arbitrary parental
decisions that neither serve nor are motivated by
77
the best interests of the child.",
6. Justice Scalia's Dissent
Justice Scalia dissented because he disagreed that the Constitution contained an
unenumerated right of parents to raise their children.78 He questioned the wisdom of
relying on precedents such as Meyer and Pierce, precedents established in the
otherwise long-overruled substantive due process era. 79 Finally,
Justice Scalia
80
cautioned against the Court entering the realm of family law.
7. Justice Kennedy's Dissent
Justice Kennedy dissented because of his disagreement with the Washington State
Supreme Court's holding that the best interests of the child standard is unconstitutional
in third-party visitation cases and that harm to the child must always be shown before
third-party visitation is allowed. 8 ' Allowing third-party visitation, while perhaps
damaging to a traditional family, is less intrusive in many of today's households where
third parties assume a significant caregiving role and develop strong bonds with the
children under their care.8 2 "[A] fit parent's right vis-A-vis a complete stranger is one
thing," Justice Kennedy wrote, "her right vis-i-vis another parent or a defacto parent
may be another."8 3 While Justice Kennedy could imagine situations where application
of the best interests standard would violate the parental constitutional rights, 84 he
concluded that courts should not completely discard the best interests standard because
it is the traditional visitation standard in family courts8 5 and would not always deprive a
parent of his or her rights.86
Justice Kennedy also addressed the harm issue. He argued that while some
precedents had allowed state action to prevent harm to children to proceed against a

74. Id. at 87. Justice Stevens also asserted that parents have a privacy interest in raising
their children without the "undue interference of strangers." Id.
75. Id.at 88.
76. See id. at 89-90.
77. Id. at 91.
78. Id. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 92.
80. Id.at 93.
81. Id.at 94, 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
82. Id.at 98.
83. Id. at 100-01 (emphasis in original).
84. Id. at 99-101.
85. Id. at 99.
86. Id.at 101.
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parent's wishes,8 7 a third-party petitioner need not prove harm to the child in every
case. 88 Based on this argument, Kennedy would conceivably require a showing of harm
from a complete stranger petitioning for visitation, but not from a defacto parent who
had cared for and established a relationship with the child. 89
II. JUST WHAT IS A PARENT'S RIGHT TO CARE, CUSTODY,
AND CONTROL OF CHILDREN?

One thing is clear: the majority of Justices past and present agree emphatically that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees parents a right to the
care, custody, and control of their children. 90 The clarity ends there. The Court has left
open for debate the nature of the right, the appropriate standard of review, and which
state interests allow for a decision against a parent's wishes for his or her child.
Perhaps intentionally, the Supreme Court has used sloppy language to describe the
parental protection afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Some opinions simply call
it a right, while others label it a liberty, 91 a liberty interest, 92 a fundamental liberty
interest, 93 or a fundamental right.94 This inconsistent language trivializes the
95
importance of the label, which determines the level of scrutiny applied to the law.
If the parent's interest is merely a right, then the government can interfere with it as
long as the interference is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest and is not
arbitrary. 96 This standard, however, is outdated: it was applied only in Meyer 97 and
Pierce,98 the oldest parental rights cases. More recent cases, such as Yoder andStanley,
have required "more than merely a 'reasonable relation to some purpose within the

87. Id. at 97-98 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) and Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944)).
88. Id.
89. See id.
at 98-99.
90. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). But see Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[W]hile I
would think it entirely compatible with the commitment to representative democracy set forth in
the founding documents to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that the
state has nopowerto interfere with parents' authority over the rearing of their children, I do not
believe that the power which the Constitution confers upon me as ajudge entitles me to deny
legal effect to laws that (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated
right.") (emphasis in original). Cf.id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) (hinting that had the parties
raised the issue of whether unenumerated rights exist under the Due Process Clause, he would
have held differently).
91. E.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
92. E.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
93. E.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1981).
94. E.g., Lassiter,452 U.S. at 48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
96. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
97. Id.
98. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (citing the Meyer doctrine in
holding that the "[education act at issue] unreasonably interferes with the liberty" rights of
parents in educating their children).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 82:499

competency of the State.' 99 More telling is that no Troxel Justice used the reasonable
relationship test,' 00 suggesting that today, the parental interest is notjust a right.
On the other end of the due process spectrum are fundamental rights, rights which
cannot be infringed unless the state's actions are justified by a compelling state interest
and are narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.' 0 ' The Court has reserved strict
scrutiny for a limited group of rights such as speech and racial equality under the law.
So although the Court sometimes labels parental rights as "fundamental" or
02
"fundamental interests," the Court has not applied strict scrutiny to parental rights,1
making these labels more adjectival than legal.'0 3
If the parent's interest exists but is neither a right nor a fundamental right, it likely
exists somewhere in between these ends of the spectrum as a liberty interest. The Court
has labeled several of these intermediate interests as liberty interests,1' 4 and the
language of Troxel suggests that the current Court sees the parental right as a liberty
interest as well.'0 5
III. INDIANA ALLOWS THIRD PARTIES TO PETITION FOR CUSTODY
Indiana has not escaped the recent changes to the American family. 1°6 Children
frequently live with caregivers other than their parents-typically grandparents.' 0 7 In
1999, to assist third parties in their parental roles, Indiana passed a statute to allow de
facto custodians to petition for custody. 10 8 Viewed together, the Indiana statutes and
cases grant third parties custody when doing so is in the best interests of the child.

99. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (emphasis added) (citing Pierce,268
U.S. at 534-35); accord Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) ("The private interest
here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and,
absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.").
100. See supra Part I.D.
101. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,155-56 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights'
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these interests may be justified only by
a 'compelling state interest,' . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake.") (internal citations omitted).
102. Contra Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
103. For example,fundamental could mean that a right has a respected tradition or a right
that is important to the structure of our society. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Confused
ConstitutionalStatus and Meaning of ParentalRights, 22 GA. L. REv. 975 (1987).
104. E.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (agreeing that refusing medical treatment is a "liberty interest"); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (describing a woman's "liberty interest" to an
abortion).
105. See supra Part I.D.
106. See Jennifer Wagner, More GrandparentsReturning to Parenting,THE INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Aug. 7, 2001, at Dl, D7.
107. See id.
108. Id.; Brandt, supra note 4, at 292.
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A. Indiana's Child Custody and Visitation Statutes
A child custody proceeding"09 begins with a petition. In Indiana, any person" 10 may
petition the court for a custody determination, a "court decision... providing for the
custody of a child, including visitation
rights."'11The court then holds a hearing on the
12
petition to determine custody.'
The judge awards custody "in accordance with the best interests of the child,''13 by
balancing several statutory factors. These factors include:
(1) The age and sex of the child. (2) The wishes of the child's parent or parents.
(3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if
the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age. (4) The interaction and
interrelationship of the child with: (A) the child's parent or parents; (B) the child's
sibling; and (C) any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interests. (5) The child's adjustment to the child's: (A) home; (B)school; and (C)
community. (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved. (7)
Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either parent. (8) Evidence
that the child has been cared for by a de facto custodian, and if the evidence is
sufficient, the court shall consider the factors described in section 8.5(b) of this
chapter. 114
In determining custody, a court first must find "that the child has been cared for by a
de facto custodian, then the de facto custodian must prove three factors by clear and
convincing evidence:' 5 (1) that he or she is the primary caregiver of the child; (2) that
he or she provides the primary financial support of the child; and (3) that he or she has
resided with the child for the required period." 6 If the court finds that the individual is
a de facto custodian, the court must make the de facto custodian a party to the
proceeding," 7 and the court must consider several additional factors when making its
custody determination. These factors are:
(1) The wishes of the child's de facto custodian. (2) The extent to which the child
has been cared for, nurtured, and supported by the de facto custodian. (3) The
intent of the child's parent in placing the child with the de facto custodian. (4) The
circumstances under which the child was allowed to remain in the custody of the
de facto custodian, including whether the child was placed with the de facto

109. A custody proceeding is a "proceeding[] in which a custody determination is one of
several issues ..." IND. CODE § 31-17-3-2(3) (2006).
110. § 31-17-2-3. This provision allows either a parent or "a person other than a parent" to
petition the court. Id.
111.

§31-17-3-2(2).

112. §§31-17-2-6to-7.
113. § 31-17-2-8.
114. Id.
According to the statute, the court "shall consider all relevant factors" and not just
those listed specifically. Id.
115. Id.§ 31-17-2-8.5(a).
116. Id.§ 31-9-2-35.5. To be a de facto custodian, a person must have resided with a child
for at least six months if the child is under the age of three or for at least one year if the child is
at least three years old. Id.

117. Id.§ 31-17-2-8.5(c).
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custodian to allow the parent now seeking custody to: (A) seek employment; (B)
work; or (C) attend school."'
After balancing both the original and de facto custodian factors, the court awards
custody based on the best interests of the child-to the parent, to the de facto
custodian,' 19 or even to another party. 20 In most situations, whichever party receives
upbringing, including the child's education,
custody may then "determine the child's
21
health care, and religious training."'
B. Application of the IndianaStatutes
1. Who May Petition for Custody?
At one time, there was some confusion about whether and when third parties could
seek custody. 122 Today, however, Indiana statutes allow any person to seek a custody

determination independently of any marital dissolution, legal separation, or child
support action. 123 The plain language of the statute allows anyone to file for a custody
determination at any time, and the Indiana Court24of Appeals has held that the statute
also allows the court to award anyone custody.'
The statute is not limited by the de facto custodian statute; a third party need not
claim to be a de facto custodian before petitioning for custody. 25 Not only are third
parties permitted to petition for custody, but they have petitioned successfully despite
not meeting the de facto custodian factors.' 2 6 Indiana courts believe that "allowing a
third party to seek custody of a child by filing a direct cause of action... is wholly

118. Id. § 31-17-2-8.5(b).
119. Section 8.5(d) provides that "[t]he court shall award custody of the child to the child's
de facto custodian if the court determines that it is in the best interests of the child." § 31-17-2-

8.5(d).
120. No Indiana statute prohibits awarding of custody to a non-parent or non-de facto
custodian. Any individual may petition the court seeking a grant of custody and become a party
to the custody proceeding. § 31-17-2-3(2).
121. § 31-17-2-17(a).
122. See In re Custody of G.J., 796 N.E.2d 756 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). At one time there was
an absolute bar against a third party receiving custody through a dissolution action. Id. at 761.
123. § 31-17-2-3(2) (authorizing "a person other than a parent" to file a petition seeking a
custody determination); In re G.J., 796 N.E.2d at 761 ("[T]he absolute bar against a trial court
awarding custody of a child to a third party in the course of a dissolution action was removed by
the 1999 de facto custodian amendments to [Indiana Code Title 31-9-2-35.5].").
124. In re G.J., 796 N.E.2d at 762-63.
125. Id. at 761. The court surmised that:
[I]f the legislature had intended to allow only de facto custodians to file a direct
child custody action, it would have been a simple matter to amend Section 31-172-3(2) at the time the de facto custodian statutes were added in 1999 to expressly
provide that a de facto custodian, rather than "a person other than a parent," could
file a child custody petition.
Id.; see also In re Parentage of A.B., 835 N.E.2d 965, 967 (Ind. 2005).
126. E.g., Allen v. Proksch, 832 N.E.2d 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (granting physical and
legal custody to a grandmother who had lived with a child over the age of three for only nine
months).
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consistent with Indiana public policy.' ' 127 When a "parent is unfit or otherwise unable

to care for a child,
it may be in the child's best interests to be placed in the custody of a
128
third party.'
2. What Must a Third Party Show to Receive Custody?
Indiana recognizes that "a child's natural parent is presumed to be entitled to
custody of his or her child as opposed to a third party., 12 9 To overcome this
presumption, a third party must prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the
child's best interests would be substantially and significantly served by placement with
the [third party] .130 The Indiana Supreme Court has provided some guidance for when
a third party might overcome the presumption.' 3' Evidence of the natural parent's
unfitness, acquiescence, or a "strong emotional bond" between the child and third party
is important, but not dispositive' 3 2 A third party's ability to provide "better things in
life for the child" is insufficient to overcome the presumption, as is a general finding
that third-party custody is in the child's best interests.' 33 The trial court is free to
consider other criteria, 134 and its judgment 35
is afforded "deferential review," reversed
only for clear error or abuse of discretion.1
3. Third-Party Success Stories
Courts have repeatedly awarded custody to third parties over the natural parent's
objections. In Franciesv. Francies,the appellate court upheld the trial court's grant of
custody to the grandmother-a de facto custodian--over the natural mother's

127. In re G.J., 796 N.E.2d at 762-63 (citing Gilchrist v. Gilchrist, 75 N.E.2d 417,419 (Ind.
1947)).
128. Id. at 763.

129. Id.; In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 287 (Ind. 2002). This presumption
traces back to Gilmore v. Kitson, 74 N.E. 1083,1087 (Ind. 1905), and Jones v. Darnall,2 N.E.

229, 232 (Ind. 1885). These early cases allowed for third party custody only if the natural parent
was unsuitable, had abandoned the child, or had acquiesced in the third party's care so that the
child and third party were "so firmly interwoven that to sunder them would seriously mar and
endanger the future happiness and welfare of the child." Gilmore, 74 N.E. at 1084.
130. In re G.J., 796 N.E.2d at 763 (citing In re B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287). De facto guardians
must also overcome the presumption. Francies v. Francies, 759 N.E.2d 1106, 1115 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2001).
13 1. In re B.H., 770 N.E. 2d at 287 (defining a standard requiring "clear and convincing
evidence" that third party placement serves the child's best interests).
132. Id. These factors also originated in early cases. See Jones, 2 N.E. at 232; Gilmore, 74
N.E. at 1085.
133. In re B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287 (citing Hendrickson v. Binkley, 316 N.E.2d 376, 381
(Ind. Ct. App. 1974)). Detailed and specific findings are required to support the finding that
third-party custody is in the child's best interests. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Huber, 723
N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 288 (citing IND. R. TRIAL P. 52(A); Chidesterv. City of Hobart, 631 N.E.2d 909,
909-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)); see also Clark v. Clark, 726 N.E.2d 854, 856 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000) ("Child custody determinations fall squarely within the discretion of the trial court and
will not be disturbed except for an abuse of discretion.").
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objections. 3 6 The trial court found that the grandmother had rebutted the parental
custody presumption by presenting evidence that the mother had voluntarily
relinquished her custody to the grandmother and that the child would be harmed by
breaking his strong emotional bond with his grandmother. 137 The parental custody
presumption rebutted, the trial court found that placement with the grandmother was in
the child's best interests because of the son's angry feelings toward his mother and the
38
grandmother's ability to provide emotional and financial support and a stable home.1
In In re Guardianship ofB.H., a mother and father married, had two children, and
later divorced. 139 The mother remarried and later died. 140 The stepfather was appointed
as the children's permanent guardian, a result upheld by the Indiana Supreme Court.' 4'
In upholding the stepfather's guardianship, the supreme court held that the trial court
was not limited to considering only whether the father was unfit, that he had
relinquished his parental rights, or that the children would be harmed by placement
with the father or separation from the stepfather. 142 Instead, the court relied on several
findings to determine that the stepfather was a "substantial and significant advantage to
the children." These findings were essentially the statutory best interest factors:' 43 the
father had not had significant interaction with the children for about seven years; the
father had been behind in his child support payments; the father had been abusive
before separating from the mother; 144 the father had a history of violence, excessive
drinking, and alcohol-related convictions; the stepfather had served as a psychological
father; living with the stepfather provided the children with better community and
family connections; the children desired to stay with the stepfather; 145 and the
stepfather provided more substantive financial support to the children.
The maternal grandmother retained permanent custody of two children over their
father's request for modification in In re Paternityof V.M 146 Benavides, the father, had
previously relinquished custody to the children's grandparents because he was
unwilling and unfit to be a parent. 147 Seven years later, the father had cleaned up: he
stopped drinking and using drugs, began attending church regularly, visited with his
children on alternate weekends, and paid child support to the grandparents. 148 The
father subsequently sought to modify the custody order. 149 The court found that the

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

759 N.E.2d 1106, 1120-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Id.at 1114.
Id.at 1117.
770 N.E.2d at 285.

Id.

Id.
at 285, 289.
Id. at 288.
143. IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8 (2006).
144. In re B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 288. The opinion does not say whom the father abused prior
to the separation, but notes that the father had a "violent confrontation with the children's
maternal aunt after the separation." Id.
145. § 31-17-2-8. The children were thirteen and fourteen at the time of the action. The
statute gives more consideration to the wishes of children "at least fourteen (14) years of age."
Id.
146. 790 N.E.2d 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
147. Id.at 1006.
148. Id
149. Id.
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father was "now capable of caring for the children"'50 and expressed its satisfaction
with his progress.' 5' Ultimately, the court found that the presumption in favor of the
father taking custody had been rebutted because of his "past unfitness, voluntary
abandonment of the children, long acquiescence of the [grandparents'] custody, and
other factors,"' 5 2 including the finding that modifying custody would harm the children
by damaging their strong relationship with the grandparents. 5 3 The children's best
interests were met by remaining with the grandparents because the children were the
focus of the grandparents' attention and affection, s4 the children could have a larger
home and more privacy with55the grandparents, and the children liked their new school
and were doing well there.'
In Nunn v. Nunn, the Indiana Court of Appeals shed more light on how a third party
could overcome the parental presumption. 5 6 Elijah Nunn and Kristina Nunn were
married and had two children; Elijah was the biological father of the son but not the
daughter. 5 7 When the couple divorced, the trial court denied Elijah custody and
visitation to his stepdaughter. 158 The appeals court reversed and remanded because
"[t]he trial court did not establish how Elijah's relationship with [his wife's child from
a prior relationship] and Kristina affected his relationship with [his stepdaughter] or
why Elijah did not meet his burden of proof regarding [his stepdaughter's] best
interests."'' 5 9 Elijah showed that he was a de facto custodian, had been a "father figure"
to the stepdaughter, and had a special father-daughter bond. 60 He also showed
evidence from which the trial court could conclude that custody with him was in the
stepdaughter's best interest--evidence of his daily care and financial support of the
stepdaughter.161
A fourth, more recent example of third-party success is Allen v. Proksch, a case
where the court granted custody to the maternal grandmother over the father's
objections. 162 The background facts are complex. The mother and father had a child,
married, and divorced, agreeing to joint legal custody.163 Over the next few years, there
were some problems with visitation and communication between the parents.'64 The
father later remarried and acquired two stepsons. 165 There were some problems with
the stepsons during visitation, and the father did not have any more contact with his

150. Id. at 1008.
151. Id.
152. Id.at 1009.
153. Id.
154. The father had a young daughter and two stepsons living with him at the time, and the
court felt that "he already has his hands full." Id. at 1008.
155. Id.
156. 791 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
157. Id.at 782.
158. Id.
159. Id.at 786.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. 832 N.E.2d 1080 (Ind.Ct. App. 2005).
163. Id.at 1083-84.
164. Id.at 1084.
165. Id.
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child until 2003, when the mother initiated a lawsuit for increased support.' 66 The
mother, however, had not seen the child either, and was using the child support
payments for her own benefit. She had since left the child permanently with his
grandmother. The child was with the grandmother from June 2002 until the mother
filed the petition in January 2003, at which time the father petitioned to modify
custody. The father was not aware that his son was staying with the grandmother. In
167
March, the grandmother petitioned for custody of the boy.
Nearly two years later, the trial court awarded legal and physical custody to the
grandmother. 168 The court found that the grandmother had overcome the presumption
in favor of the father because he had previously abandoned his son. 169 Placement with
the grandmother was in the child's best interests because the grandparents provided
him with greater stability, better care for his unique medical and psychological needs,
and financial support.170 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's holding, finding
that there was no abuse of discretion and that the trial court could have made its
171
findings based on the evidence.
4. Parental Success Stories
Third parties have been less successful in their attempts to attain custody when the
natural parent is clearly capable and willing to raise his or her child. For example, inln
re GuardianshipofL.L., a fit mother prevailed over a grandmother.172 In 1992, Trudy
Litrell married Jerry Litrell, Wilma Clark's son. Trudy and Jerry had two sons but were
unable to care for them because of their drug and alcohol abuse, so Wilma stepped in
and was appointed temporary guardian. 173 In 1994, Trudy dissolved the guardianship
for the older boy (then five years old), but she failed in
her attempts to dissolve the
74
guardianship of the younger boy (then two years old).1
Meanwhile, the mother cleaned up her life. She remarried a successful construction
manager, started a steady job, and lived in "a very nice country home with plenty of
play space and good neighbors with young children."' 175 Nevertheless, the trial court
again denied her petition to terminate her son's guardianship. 176 On appeal, the court
acknowledged Troxel's constitutional "preference in favor of a parent having custody

166. Id.
167. Id. The mother did not oppose the grandmother's petition and did not appear at later
hearings. Id.
168. Id.at 1088.
169. Id.at 1094.
170. Sce id.
171. Id. at I101.
172. 745 N.E.2d 222, 233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Although the matter was technically a
guardianship case, the court of appeals applied the same standards and precedents used in
custody cases. The mother petitioned to terminate the grandmother's guardianship. See id. at
227 ("This appears to be ... in essence, a child custody proceeding that raises important
concerns about parental rights and the 'best interests' of children.").
173. Id.
174. Id. at 225-26.
175. Id. at 226. The mother had been drug- and alcohol-free for six years at this time. Id.
176. Id. at 227.
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of his or her children, where the parent has not been shown to be unfit.""' Applying
this presumption, the court terminated the guardianship because the grandmother had
presented insufficient evidence to rebut the presumption: "[t]here is absolutely no
indication that Trudy is presently an unfit parent .... It was Wilma's78burden to prove
Trudy's unfitness at the present time, not at some time in the past."',
The natural father in In re Paternityof J.A.C. was also capable and willing to raise
his child. 179 After the father and mother had begun a relationship, the mother was
8
180
diagnosed with cancer. Two years after the diagnosis, they had a child together.' 1
Six weeks after the birth, the mother was told she had six months to live.' 82 She left the
house 8 3 and moved in with her sister, appointing her sister to be the child's guardian
upon her death.184 The mother died, and the child's aunt became guardian. The father
moved to dismiss this guardianship. 185 The trial court did award custody to the father;
however, it also awarded visitation rights to the child's aunt over the father's
objections. 186 On appeal, the father argued that the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law were insufficient to support the visitation order.' 8 7 He also argued
that the visitation order interfered with his constitutional right to family privacy, citing
Troxel. 188 The appeals court reversed the trial court because the aunt had not shown
that she had a "custodial and parental" relationship with the child or that visitation
would be in the child's best interests. 189 The appeals court declined to reach
the
190
constitutional question because it resolved the case on an evidentiary basis.
IV. IS INDIANA'S "MEASURE OF PROTECTION FOR RIGHTS OF A NATURAL PARENT"
ENOUGH? POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE INDIANA STATUTES

The Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution protects a natural parent's
liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children, absent a
"powerful, countervailing"' 9' state interest. 92 While a narrow interpretation of Troxel
applies only to parent's rights regarding third-party visitation, a broader interpretation
would subject third-party custody statutes to Troxel's standards. Because of their
permanence, custody determinations pose a greater threat to a parent's liberty interest
than do visitation orders. Visitation may be for a week, a few days, or even just hours,
and may be supervised or in the parent's home. Custody determinations, however, may

177. Id. at 229.
178. Id. at231.
179. 734 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind.Ct. App. 2001).
180. Id.at 1058.
181. Id.
182. Id.

183. Id. The mother and father's relationship was "tumultuous." Id.
184. Id.

185. Id.
186. Id.

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 1058 n.1 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).
Id. at 1060 (quoting Francis v. Francis, 654 N.E.2d 4, 7 (Ind.Ct. App. 1995)).
Id.at 1058 n.1; id.at 1061 n.5 (Robb, J., concurring).

191. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
192. See supra Part II.
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completely strip a parent of his or her opportunity to care for his or her children,
perhaps even making the parent the visitor. l93
Indiana's statutes and interpretive case law do provide a "measure ofprotection for
the rights of the natural parent" by presuming that custody with the parent is in the
child's best interest. 94 But that measure of protection may not be enough to satisfy the
constitutional requirements. Several potential constitutional problems exist with
Indiana's current third-party custody scheme.
A. Indiana Code Section 31-17-2-3(2) Is Unconstitutional
Under Troxel v. Granville
A strict, plain-meaning interpretation of the Indiana statutes would permit anyone to
petition the court for custody or visitation at any time.195 Indiana Code section 31-17-23(2) specifically grants any "person other than a parent" standing to petition for 97a
custody determination, 196 and the courts have accepted this literal interpretation. 1
This interpretation exposes the statute to two constitutional criticisms: (1) overbreadth
and (2) the threat of burdensome litigation.
1. A Statute Allowing Any Person to Petition at
Any Time Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad
A majority of Justices in Troxel acknowledged that a statute which allowed any
person to petition the court for visitation rights at any time, subject only to a "best
interests test," was unconstitutionally overbroad. 98 Four Justices come from the
plurality, which based its decision on the statute's "sweeping breadth."' 99 Justice
Souter makes five Justices because of his statement that the "right of upbringing would
be a sham if it failed to encompass the right to be free ofjudicially compelled visitation
by any party at any time a judge believed he could make a better decision than the
objecting parent had done." 200 Justice Stevens might be a sixth Justice, because he
reasoned that an "any person" statute could be valid in some applications but invalid in
others, depending on the child's relationship to the third-party petitioner.20 '
2. Burdensome Litigation Could Unconstitutionally Burden a Parent's Rights
While it may not be against public policy to allow third-party petitioners in the
majority of cases, the possibility of abuse is another constitutional problem with

193. See In re Paternity of V.M., 790 N.E.2d 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
194. Id. at 1007.
195. See supra Part III.A.
196. A custody proceeding is a proceeding in which a custody determination is one of
several issues. IND. CODE § 31-17-3-2(3) (2004).
197. See, e.g., In re Custody of G.J., 796 N.E.2d 756, 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
198. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 76 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 73 (plurality opinion).
200. Id. at 78 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
201. See id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting). His examples of valid third parties are those with
a genetic or emotional relationship to the child.
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Indiana's statute. A majority of the Justices 20 2 in Troxel hinted that "the burden of
litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be so disruptive ofthe parent-child
relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic
determinations for the child's welfare becomes implicated., 20 3 The plurality said it did
not want to remand the case and "further burden Granville's parental right. ''204 This
language indicates that litigation can burden the parental right and that Granville's
rights had already been burdened by the previous litigation.
The overbreadth of Indiana's statute allows for the possibility of litigation that
would burden the parental right. In most cases, the third-party petitioner will be quite
familiar with the parent and child and will be acting out of concern. In some cases,
however, the third-party petitioner's judgment could be clouded by emotions such as
anger or revenge. 205 In these cases, the parent is more likely to be fit and willing to
raise his or her child than in cases where the third-party petitioner acts out of concern.
A third-party petitioner with improper motives interferes with the parent's right to
custody of the child by initiating burdensome litigation.
B. The Statutes Give No Special Weight to a FitParent'sDecision
Not giving a fit parent's wishes some "special weight" in a best interests decision
infringes on a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her
children.20 6 The Troxel plurality held that "if a fit parent's decision .. .becomes
subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the
parent's own determination." 20 7 Even though no fifth Troxel Justice required special
weight be given to the parent's wishes, statutes giving equal weight to de facto
guardians and parents are constitutionally risky because a fifth Justice could be easy to
come by and because the Court's composition has changed since Troxel.208 To be safe,
any "best interests analysis" should
include the presumption that the parent will act in
2 9
0
interests.
best
child's
her
or
his
In Indiana, in custody cases not involving de facto custodians, "the wishes of the
child's parent or parents" is one factor the court may consider in determining the
child's best interests. 210 In cases where a third party has established himself as a de
facto custodian by clear and convincing evidence, 21 1 courts may also consider "[t]he

202. For those keeping score, the plurality Justices (O'Connor, Rehnquist, Ginsberg, and
Breyer) and Kennedy mentioned the possibility of litigation infringing on parental rights.
203. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75 (plurality opinion) (quotations omitted); see id.
at 101 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
204. Id.at 75 (plurality opinion).
205. See Lynn D. Wardle, All You NeedIs Love?, 14 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 51,
57-58 (2004) (explaining how emotions drive most family law proceedings).
206. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
207. Id.at 70.
208. Two members of the Troxel plurality were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, Justices who are no longer on the Court. The additions of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito could preserve the plurality, dissolve the plurality, or present new lines of
thought regarding the parental fitness presumption.
209. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 89-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8(2) (2006).
211. IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8.5(a) (2006).
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wishes of the child's de facto custodian. 212 As the statutes do not prioritize the best
interest factors, technically the wishes of the parents and the wishes of the de facto
custodian could receive equal consideration. 213 And even if there is no de facto
custodian, the parent's wishes are not required to receive any special weight.
C. The Standardfor Rebutting the ParentalFitness PresumptionIs Too Lax
"There is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. 21 4
Without a finding of unfitness, "there will normally be no reason for the State to inject
itself into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to
make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children. ''215 Six Troxel
Justices agreed that state interference without some showing of unfitness could
unconstitutionally burden a parent's liberty interests.216 In the plurality's view, the trial
court was wrong to ignore the mother's wishes absent a finding that she was an unfit
parent. 21 7 In dissent, Justice Stevens stated that the statute's failure to require a finding
of parental unfitness did not make the statute facially unconstitutional,21 8 suggesting
that a showing of unfitness might be constitutionally required in another situation.
Finally, while Justice Kennedy would not require satisfying the harm to the child
standard in every case, 219he
acknowledge[d] the distinct possibility that visitation cases may arise where,
considering the absence of other protection for the parent under state laws and
procedures, the best interests of the child standard would give insufficient
protection to the parent's constitutional right to raise the child without undue
intervention by the state ...220
Essentially, the Troxel Court collectively upheld the presumption that parents act in
their children's best interests. If parents act in their children's best interests, it follows
that the parent's decision is the best interest, and any "best interests analysis" before a
finding of parental unfitness is premature and could unconstitutionally burden the
parent's rights.221
Indiana law claims to require a third party to rebut the parental fitness presumption
before engaging in a "best interests analysis., 222 Indiana law, however, allows rebuttal
212. IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8.5(b)(a) (2006).
213. But see In re Guardianship of L.L., 745 N.E.2d 222, 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("We
believe the intent of the 'de facto custodian' amendments is to clarify that a third party may have
standing in certain custody proceedings, and that it may be in a child's best interests to be
placed in that party's custody. We do not believe there was [legislative] intent to displace the
parental preference presumption.").
214. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (plurality opinion).
215. Id. at 68-69.
216. See id.(plurality opinion); id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 68-70 (plurality opinion).
218. Id.at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. See id.at 94, 98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
220. Id.at 94.
221. This rule would apply only to disagreements between a parent and a third party, not to
disagreements between parents.
222. See In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283 (Ind.2002).
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of the parental fitness presumption without specifically addressing parental unfitness.
The law states that to successfully rebut the parental fitness presumption, a third party
must prove "by clear and convincing evidence that the child's best interests would be
substantially and significantly served by placement with the [third party]. 2 23 Under
this test, a third party could overcome the presumption by showing evidence of a strong
emotional bond with the child or evidence that the third party's judgment of the child's
best interests is better than the parent's. 224 Such a disjointed standard allows for the
possibility that "a court [could] disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial
225
parent.., based solely on the judge's determination of the child's best interests.,
And because the trial court's judgment is given such "deferential review,, 226 (and
because parties may not be financially able to appeal) such abuses of parental
constitutional rights may remain unchecked.
CONCLUSION: SOLUTIONS FOR THE INDIANA STATUTES

A. Statutory Solutionsfor Indiana'sCustody Statutes
Although Indiana's current custody statutes often reach the "right" practical results,
constitutional problems present the potential for abuse. As such, the statutes should be
amended to prevent abuses. Amendments can easily bring Indiana's statutes into
conformity with the Federal Constitution by meeting Troxel's three requirements:
giving special weight to a fit parent's decision, not allowing "anyone, anytime"
statutes, and acknowledging the parental fitness presumption.
The Indiana Code provision allowing anyone to petition for custody at any time227 is
overbroad 228 and must be changed in one of several ways. First, the provision could be
deleted, allowing third parties seeking rights
in relation to a child to meet their needs
229
using other laws with less danger of abuse.
Second, the "anyone, anytime" problem could be fixed by amending the statute to
allow only parents or de facto custodians to petition for custody. Parties claiming to be
de facto custodians would need to plead their status when filing for custody. This
change would require that the third-party petitioner have a significant relationship with
the child and would decrease the chance that more distant third parties would petition
out of improper motives. Because several of the Justices in Troxel suggested that a
relationship is important, this change would probably make the statute constitutional
and allow third parties to get custody in a direct action. If the legislature thought that

223. In re G.J., 796 N.E.2d at 763 (quoting In re B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287). De facto

guardians must also overcome the presumption. See Francies v. Francies, 759 N.E.2d 1106,
1115 (Ind.Ct. App. 2001).

224. See In re B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287. The test allows for other criteria to be used, too. See
id. By considering any evidence instead of requiring a more specific showing, Indiana law
actually weakens the parental presumption it seeks to protect. See id. at 289-90 (Shepard, C.J.,
concurring).
225. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (plurality opinion) (second emphasis added).
226. In Re B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 288.

227. See

IND. CODE

§ 31-17-2-3 (2006).

228. See supra Part IV.A.1.

229. See Brandt, supranote 4, at 292,297-300 (analyzing alternatives to de facto custody).
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the qualifications for a de facto custodian were too high to be practical,
it could always
230
reduce them in a way that still required a meaningful relationship.
A third alternative-addressing the constitutional importance of the parental fitness
presumption-would be to require a third party seeking custody to plead parental
unfitness by a heightened standard. Currently, the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure
require only "a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief' 231 unless the party is pleading fraud or mistake. 232 The reputational interests
supporting heightened pleading in fraud and mistake 233 could also support heightened
pleading in parental unfitness matters. This would make third-party petitions more
difficult and give greater protection to the parent's rights. Third parties could meet this
heightened standard by pleading that a parent was harming a child, perhaps because of
alcoholism, drug abuse, failure to provide financially, or failure to care for the child.
Requiring this extra step of specifically pleading parental unfitness protects a fit
parent's right to the care, custody, and control of his or her children. This extra
requirement is logical if courts really mean what they say when they quote the
presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.
Depending on changes in the previous provision, an additional statute providing the
factors for consideration in a parent/third-party custody action may also be necessary.
This statute would contain all the factors in the current best interests statute234 but
would also include the presumption that a fit parent acts in his or her child's best
interests and his or her decisions must be given special weight. However, this addition
would be unnecessary if third parties had to prove parental unfitness before petitioning
for custody.
B. NonstatutorySolutionsfor Indiana's Custody Statutes
In addition to (or in lieu of) statutory changes, a secondary legal action could
provide the necessary check on the overbreadth of Indiana's custody statutes. Parents
whose custody was challenged frivolously by a third party could bring a malicious
prosecution claim 235 against the third party or the third party's attorney. However, this
option may not sufficiently deter malicious lawsuits because malicious prosecution
claims could only be brought afterthe parent won the custody case,236 and courts use a
high standard in judging malicious prosecution claims so as not to chill legitimate
litigation.237 Additionally, the successful parent may not have the financial or
emotional resources to bring a malicious prosecution claim.

230. See id.
231. IND. R. TRIAL P. 8(A)(1) (2006).
232. IND. R. TRIAL P. 9(B) (2006).
233. See generally 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1296 (3d ed. 2006).
234. IND. CODE § 31-17-2-8 (2006).
235. A successful malicious prosecution requires proof that the defendant maliciously and
without probable cause brought an action which was resolved in the plaintiff's favor (including
withdrawal of claims by the defendant). See, e.g., City of New Haven v. Reichart, 748 N.E.2d
374, 378 (Ind. 2001); Kho v. Pennington, 846 N.E.2d 1036, 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
236. See Reichart, 748 N.E.2d at 378.

237. See Kho, 846 N.E.2d at 1042.
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Unresolved issues surrounding parental constitutional rights certainly create
difficulties at the courts and the legislatures. This ambiguity dates from the first
parental right case and has only increased with subsequent cases. Future cases should
clarify some of the mysteries of Troxel v. Granvilleand the other parent's rights cases.
Until then, we will continue to quote the century-old language of Meyer and Pierce
without knowing what rights parents really have or what protection those rights
receive.

